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Based on Freeman’s model of interest group-driven migration policies,
the article gives a qualitative inside look on a neglected actor during the
formative years of US immigration reform. It analyzes the central role
of the shipping companies in coordinating the pro-immigration cam-
paign with and against other interest groups. Their lobbying is divided
into two complementary sections: inside top-down efforts (lobbyists) to
influence legislators and outside bottom-up efforts (migrant communi-
ties and the press) to mobilize the public. It assesses the importance of
public opinion in their lobby campaigns and the shipping companies’
success in delaying far-reaching restrictions until 1917.
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2006, the United States witnessed one of its largest civic
mobilizations. Millions of protesters took the streets against pending repres-
sive immigration bills that criminalize illegal migrants. Supported by vari-
ous interest groups defending immigration, the Hispanic community
carried the movement. Instigated by the Spanish-language media, they
reminded legislators: “today we march, tomorrow we vote.” The next year,
a law was considered including a major regularization program for illegal
immigrants. This time, conservatives launched a massive media campaign
denouncing the bill for giving “amnesty to lawbreakers” (Suro 2009, 206–
07; Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra 2011, 118). Suro (2009, 220) observed
that press coverage on immigration in the last 30 years has been increas-
ingly lopsided, focusing on its negative aspects. However, he also posed that
thanks to new media, press coverage on immigration bills greatly increased,
empowering the opposition of minorities of the public to create a stalemate
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on the issue since 1986. After the large turnout of the Hispanic vote in the
2012 elections underlining their growing electoral importance, some con-
gressmen are currently hoping to break the stalemate.
If they succeed, this would however not be a first. As Goldin (1994,
223) observed, the perplexing part of early US immigration restriction his-
tory is not that authorities closed the gates for Europeans, but that it took
so long to do it. This battle centered on bills containing a literacy test
aimed at curbing the then booming movement from eastern and southern
Europe. Such bills based on racial prejudice passed one of the houses of
Congress 17 times between 1896 and 1917 before finally being enacted. In
the meantime, 17 million immigrants, most of them “in-betweens,” landed
in the United States. Goldin identified four interest groups: labor unions,
native rural America, capital owners, and immigrant communities, with
changing coalitions. Restrictions eventually passed because of the ever-in-
creasing support in rural America curtailing the pro-immigration votes to
major urban centers where migrants concentrated (ibid., 224, 255–56).
Applying Freeman’s model based on interest group-driven migration
policies, Zolberg and Tichenor refined the category of “pressure groups”
that were involved in the pro- and anti-immigration lobby campaigns,
which showed that the involvement and motives of certain groups chan-
ged over time and sometimes led to new coalitions. Tichenor stresses the
impact of institutional changes, expert narratives, and global pressures on
migration policy during the Progressive Era. Yet studies remain on the
surface on how interest groups lobbied and to what extent they adapted
their strategies according to the changes which shaped migration policies
(Goldin 1994; Freeman 1995; Tichenor 2002; Zolberg 2006). This paper
addresses this gap giving a qualitative inside look on a totally neglected
interest group — the shipping companies. The article uncovers practicali-
ties of lobbying and how coalitions between interest groups were forged.
It stresses the need to further distinguish the interests groups into separate
factions. It suggests that shipping companies were the most consistent
pro-immigration actors within the “capital-owner” interest group and
coordinated the efforts of immigration advocates. The article highlights
that the passage of the Literacy Test and Quota acts, what Tichenor
(2002, 12) called the triumph of restrictionists, came when the shipping
lobby fell apart due to global pressures. Freeman’s (1995, 885; 2002, 77–
78) diffuse cost and concentrated benefits paradigm accounting for the
gap between liberal policies and restrictive public opinion will be
tested. Is the stalemate over the literacy test an outcome of an organized
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pro-migrant lobby winning over a resource-weak diffuse anti-migrant
lobby? Or do we see, as Geddes and Statham (2006, 248) suggested,
political elites tending to favor restrictions determining policies relatively
autonomously over a weak civil society engagement?
Drawing their main revenue from third- and second-class migrant
transport, shipping line’s motives to fight restrictions are obvious. Yet as
any other interest group, answering how is much more difficult due to
the secretive nature of lobbying. Using the correspondence of the New
York agent of the Holland America Line (HAL) with the directors in Rot-
terdam and lobbyists in Washington, this article answers Geddes and Sta-
ham’s calls (2006, 206) and Bonjour’s (2011, 117) for more empirical
studies on why liberal states accepted unwanted migration. It also
responds to Freeman and Kessler’s call (2008, 670–73) for research on
how interest groups mobilize and influence individuals. The lobby strate-
gies can be divided into two complementary sections: inside top-down
efforts to influence legislators and outside bottom-up efforts to mobilize
the public. These evolved according to rising anti-trust pressures exposing
the visible hand of corporate interests in American political and public
spheres. The interest groups advocating immigration restrictions used the
growing mistrust towards corporations as an integrated part of their lobby
campaigns. How the shipping lobby countered the opposition by closing
their ranks and mobilizing immigrant groups is discussed.
Kl€uver (2013, 59) highlighted that contemporary lobbying is a col-
lective enterprise and its success depends on information supply, citizen
support, and economic power. The collectivization of the pro-immigration
lobby with special attention to information supply and citizen support
will be discussed. How do pressure groups shape the relationship between
the public and the politics of immigration policy? Did they stir the public
opinion in general or specific segments? What role did ethnicity have on
this segmentation? How did they use the media? As Bonjour (2011, 111)
questioned, was this public opinion in all historical circumstances in favor
of restrictions? Are immigration controls developed in response to the
public? What can the passage of the literacy test tell us on today’s dead-
lock around immigration reform?
SHIPPING CARTELS AND THE PRO-IMMIGRATION LOBBY
Freeman (1995, 885) posed that: “immigration tends to produce concen-
trated benefits and diffuse costs, giving those who benefit from immigra-
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tion greater incentives to organise than persons who bear its costs.” As the
immigrant developed into the most valuable commodity on the North
Atlantic trade route, no interest group benefited more directly from the
long nineteenth century mass migration than shipping companies. Keeling
(2012, 284–85) showed that nearly all passengers traveling third class and
the great majority of second class were migrants. First class was nearly
exclusively reserved to business and leisure travel and represented about
13 percent of the total traffic. Keeling (1999, 40) estimated that shipping
companies drew more than half of their revenues from migrant transport
and less than a quarter each on non-migrant and freight transport, respec-
tively. Followed by employers, ethnic communities, and cosmopolitans,
they profited from the general assumption that immigration was essential
to the growth of the United States.
As pointed out by Klebaner (1958) and later corroborated by Jones
(1992) and Zolberg (2006), the shipping lobby shaped the enactment of
federal migrant transport regulations, state immigration laws, and the
implementation thereof before the 1880s. The shipping interests favored
stalemates on the issue as generally less regulation resulted in higher bene-
fits. To accomplish this, they played out the rivalry between Atlantic ports
to attract the trade and instigated jurisdiction disputes between federal
and state authorities. Yet by the 1870s, the port of New York won the
battle for the trade, while the Supreme Court moved all immigration mat-
ters under federal authority. No longer being able to oppose state and fed-
eral interests, the shipping lobby resorted to the rhetoric that migration
was a matter of trade subordinate to international treaties based on
reciprocity. They instigated attempts to reach international agreements to
stall one-sided actions. In the meantime, views that immigration came at
a social and economic cost threatening the racial integrity of the nation
gained momentum. The pressures spurred the growing sentiment that
migration was a matter of national sovereignty which led to the first
major immigration reform in 1882 (Feys 2010, 39–44).
This reform resulted in the exclusion of Chinese laborers and a first
general law excluding idiots, paupers, and convicts. Up to 1917, legisla-
tion limited the Asian influx, while leaving the European flow largely
undisturbed and allowing it to swell and spread to eastern and southern
Europe. Even before the restrictions, transpacific migration was only a
small fraction of the size of transatlantic movement, and shipping interests
never reached the same importance as on the Atlantic (Heffer and Wilson
2002, 44–45). Their absence in the legislative debates on Asian immigra-
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tion stands in strong contrast with their Atlantic counterparts. By the
1880s, the transport of European migrants had shifted from sail to steam
ships. Apart from reducing travel time, risks, and costs of migration, this
transition led to a concentration of the migrant transport in the hands of
a limited number of joint-stock companies. The American flag that domi-
nated the migrant transport during the age of sail quickly declined, leav-
ing the market nearly exclusively to European companies. The British
took over the lead which was gradually undermined by continental lines,
in particular the German Hamburg American Line (HAPAG) and the
Nord German Lloyd (NGL). Lobby campaigns were initially divided
between American, British, and continental shipping interests before clus-
tering during the 1900s (Cohn 2005, 490; Keeling 2012).
The keen competition for the migrant trade led to the creation of
three main passenger cartels known as shipping conferences. These collusive
agreements had to mitigate competition and reduce the effects of trade fluc-
tuations, primarily by regulating prices (Ville 1990, 95). The British com-
panies inaugurated the practice and controlled their internal market and
Scandinavia, supplemented by some continental passengers. Besides fixing
ocean passage prices, the British–Scandinavian shipping conference regu-
lated sailing dates, routes, ports of call, advertisement strategies, fixed com-
missions for migrant agents selling tickets, and stipulated rules to regulate
their sales. Tickets were sold on both sides of the Atlantic, approximately
70 percent in Europe and 30 percent in the United States. On both conti-
nents, representatives of the companies convened frequently to ensure the
compliance to the agreements and discuss general business matters in which
lobbying against immigration restrictions became an integrated part. Initi-
ally the cartels suffered from internal and external pressures leading to
recurrent rate wars and occasionally allowing new companies to pentrate
the market (Boyce 1995; Greenhill 1998; Deltas, Sefres, and Sicotte 1999).
The continental lines organized their own shipping conference but
took the agreements a step further. Drawing most of their passengers from
continental Europe, they divided this market into shares. This neutralized
the internal competitive pressures between the members much better, giv-
ing the continental lines an edge on the British lines for the North Atlan-
tic migrant traffic. A third conference was established to regulate the
traffic from the Mediterranean. Inter-conference agreements developed
into a general pact for the entire North Atlantic migrant traffic involving
30 companies in 1908 (Murken 1922; Feys 2008; Keeling 2012). Records
of passenger shipping companies have rarely been preserved or very
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poorly, except for the HAL. This work is based on the correspondence
between New York head-agents and the Dutch directors in which
lobbying strategies were discussed. It includes copies of the correspon-
dence with lobbyists in Washington. For the first time in research on
migration policy during the Progressive Era (1890–1920), this unique pri-
mary source addresses lobbying from the point of an interest group itself.
The information relates not only to the company but also to its closest
cartel partners the NGL and HAPAG. With the expansion of the cartel
agreements, the correspondence gives a unique inside view on the passen-
ger shipping lobby as whole. The fourth continental cartel partner, the
Red Star Line (RSL), was initially not included in the lobbying strategies
because of its American ownership. Together with its sister company, the
American Line, RSL owners lobbied the US Congress to pass maritime
and migration policies which would give American companies competitive
advantages to the detriment of foreign lines. This explains the division
between and within the shipping interests until 1902 when, due to a big
shipping merger, the interests converged.
INSIDE LOBBYING FROM TOP-DOWN
The HAL established a passenger service between Rotterdam and New
York during the steam-shipping boom early 1870s. As many other lines
during the start-up phase, it relied on the consular corps to promote and
defend the company’s interests abroad. Sometimes consuls even repre-
sented the line. This consolidated the HAL’s close ties with the Dutch
diplomatic corps who, during the first decades, intervened in lobbying
practices. Like other companies, HAL initially voiced their claims against
American immigration laws through their diplomats. They defended the
rhetoric that migration depended on trade treaties and dragged negotia-
tions for an international agreement on transatlantic migrant transport,
including international courts to enforce the pact. The negotiations served
predominantly to stall national migration reform in the United States
between the late 1860s and 1880s. Passenger shipping interests provided
diplomats with arguments and means. The 1882 immigration law put an
end to this, establishing a turning point also for European countries and
their diplomats who now recognized migration control as a matter of
national sovereignty. Contesting the right of who was getting in was no
longer conceivable, yet passenger acts regulating how migrants were trans-
ported remained disputable. Congress had also passed new space, hygienic,
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and food requirements reducing the capacity of the ships with the new
Passenger Act (1882). The Dutch envoy in Washington, G. de Weckher-
lin, advised against fighting the provision by claiming that Dutch ships
abided their own national laws and challenged the jurisdiction of US
authorities on Dutch vessels. Protesting against a humanitarian measure
was delicate. Weckherlin suggested reopening the negotiations for an
international treaty. He was backed by his Belgian, Italian, and French
colleagues and the US secretary of state, F. Frelinghuysen. Yet the initia-
tive was compromised by the German and English interests who presented
a joint resolution to unify the American passenger acts with theirs. A con-
gressional commission investigating this resolution obstructed the efforts
to reach a broader international convention.1
Throughout the 1880s, this remained a contested issue. Weckherlin
represented the Dutch shipping lines in court cases regarding violations of
the US Passenger Act. The diplomat also supported propaganda campaigns
to defend the reputation of Dutch passenger lines among the American
public.2 Yet with the viewing of immigration as a national sovereignty mat-
ter, diplomats became reluctant to intervene on behalf of shipping compa-
nies. The latter increasingly relied on lobbyists to defend their interests in
Washington. These were generally recruited from specialized law firms and
preferably had served as congressman before. Former Senator Roscoe Con-
kling worked for the shipping interests during the 1882 migration reform.
He was held responsible for the veto of his former protege, President
Arthur, against a radical version of the Passenger Act. In his message,
Arthur stated that it imposed excessive losses on shipping companies. In
the end, Congress adopted a milder version closer to European passenger
acts (Hutchinson 1981, 78–79; Jones 1989, 329; Zolberg 2006, 192–93).
In the mid-1880s, the HAL hired a full-time lobbyist, George Glavis,
described as “the lobbyist of the Conference Lines knowing all the inside
tracks.” He replaced Weckherlin in courts and before the Treasury Depart-
ment. He also functioned as spokesman in Congress. Glavis monitored all
congressional debates on migration and maritime issues. Representing the
1G. de Weckherlin to Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs, letters and reports, May 4, June
29, July 3, and August 14, 1882, February 16, March 28, April 14, 16, and 30, May 18,
and June 5, 19, and 20, 1883, and April 12, 1884; Dutch National Archives, Gezantschap
USA, 2.05.13, 210; New York Consul C. Mali to Minister of Foreign Affairs W. Frere-
Orban, correspondence, February 16 to July 28, 1883; Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Archives, Emigration, 2961 I.
2Ibid.
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German lines as well, he conferred with the three shipping companies on a
joint line of action. The lobbyist distributed arguments against restrictions
among congressmen. The establishment in 1889 of special immigration
committees in the House and Senate to evaluate bills opened new doors for
interest groups to influence legislation. Glavis organized the hearings of the
shipping lobby at the immigration committees, inviting experts to defend
the liberal cause. Similar hearings were organized before the president when
a veto was solicited. When it seemed likely that a law would pass, the lobby
stalled action on it by introducing amendments, bringing up other issues
for consideration, filibustering or claiming the need for an investigation
commission to collect more information. In the latter case, Glavis made
sure that people defending the interests of the shipping lines sat in these
commissions. If these measures did not prevent the bills from being consid-
ered, the lines weakened its negative impact as much as possible. Glavis
provided congressmen with amendments which safeguarded the interests of
passenger companies. At their expense, the lobbyist organized dinners and
distributed gifts and free passages to Europe to create goodwill. He also
channeled contributions to campaign funds of both Democrats and Repub-
licans. To make sure that the laws that did pass were implemented in their
favor, Glavis also lobbied for the appointment of liberals at key positions in
the federal immigration administration established in 1891.3 In particular,
the commissioner general of immigration leading the administration in
Washington and the commissioner of immigration of New York leading
Ellis Island — both designated by the president — were key. The shipping
lines sometimes got their way as with the appointment of Robert Watchorn
at Ellis Island. Other times they did not, as with his predecessor and succes-
sor serving two terms, the nativist William Williams. Yet Williams was
forced to resign during his first term following a press campaign crafted by
the pro-immigration lobby, bringing him disrepute. A similar attempt dur-
ing his second term was less successful (Feys 2013, 271–76, 306–11).
This surge of the so-called “third house” allowing lobbyists to gain
importance as middlemen between politicians and corporations has to be
seen against the background of institutional changes, shifts in party politics,
the rise of progressivism, and new waves of nativism. A new form of politi-
cal organization took shape around the turn of the twentieth century.
3Head agency New York to directors Rotterdam, Correspondence 1883–1902, Municipal
Archives Rotterdam (MAR), Holland-Amerika Lijn (HAL) collection, 318.02 Directors,
112–121; 318.04 Passage, 221–26.
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Besides elections and protest movements, direct involvement in legislative
activity was emerging as a model for popular political participation. This
involvement was less guided by partisan loyalty which was in decline, but
ever more by interest groups which mobilized voters (Clemens 1997, 1–5).
To asses this, Clemens reminded us that how interest groups organized is
equally as important as why. Tichenor (2002, 30–33) underlined the
importance of changes both within and between institutions which created
opportunities to exercise influence. Group alliances opposing immigration
restrictions were faster to adapt to these changes than their counterparts.
Also their role in influencing expert narratives and their reaction to global
pressures will be addressed to complete Tichenor’s (2002, 49) suggested
processes of analysis shaping immigration policy making during the Pro-
gressive Era. The new currency of political influence included top-down
procedural mastery and technical expertise which lobbyists increasingly
coordinated in Washington. A third new political currency, the mobiliza-
tion of the public opinion, is of a bottom-up nature (Clemens 1997, 2–4).
How shipping companies relied on journalists and voluntary associations
representing migrant communities for this is the next point of analysis. Such
voluntary organizations, often having formal committees to draft legislation,
lobby, and cultivate public opinion, boomed during the Progressive Era.
They helped individuals formulate their demands and monitor how politi-
cians acted on them. For their part, politicians became more able to create
ties to these electoral blocs and become less dependent on party leadership
(Clemens 1997, 1–8).
OUTSIDE LOBBYING FROM BOTTOM-UP
Campaigns in Washington carried much further when supported by the
public. Through advertising, shipping companies had close ties with the
press. As Mora (2005, 29–31, 337–39) underlined, the rise of mass media
gave public opinion a forum to develop and went hand-in-hand with the
beginnings of mass advertisement campaigns. At the same time, mass
media became the place of predilection of pressure groups to voice their
arguments and influence both public and politicians alike. Most of the
advertisement budget of the passenger lines targeted cabin-class passengers
and went to the bigger newspapers such as the New York Herald, Times,
Tribune, Sun, the Washington Post, or Chicago Tribune. Another part of
the budget went to the foreign-language press. Migrant-class advertisement
was mostly left to the migrant agents. HAL had 1,250 to 2,000 agents
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representing them in all parts of the United States. These agents com-
bined the sale of ocean passage tickets with migrant-specific banking ser-
vices, in particular remittances. Often other types of related business were
added ranging from notaries, real estate agents, saloon keepers, and gro-
cers. Newspaper owners represented an important subcategory. In this for-
eign press, migrant agents advertised their agency and the shipping lines
they represented. Conference rules prohibited advertisements to contain
comparisons between companies and tried to limit their amount to neu-
tralize competition. They withdrew all advertising from papers that openly
attacked the interests of the shipping conference (Dillingham report vol.
37, 1911; Jones 1992, 195; Day 2002, 77–78; Feys 2013, 110–13).
Shipping lines used these connections when pressures to restrict migra-
tion increased. In the wake of the 1892 cholera epidemic, migrant traffic
was temporarily suspended. Restrictionists led by Senator W. Chandler used
the momentum to demand a one-year immigration stop to prepare restric-
tive reforms. The NGL, HAPAG, and HAL appointed a commission that
screened the press for newspapers agitating against them. They hired jour-
nalists to answer the hostile articles, write, and collect propaganda to dis-
tribute among newspaper editors. The campaign centered on western states
depicting restrictions as a scheme of eastern interests to hamper the develop-
ment of the West. As the New York head-agent of the HAL reported:
The Eastern gutter press predicts that the law will pass, while more serious papers don’t
mention it. The secret agitation of the shipping lines out of Washington targeting the
western voters through local western papers triggered an important wave of protest against
restrictions. Western Senators and Representatives will not dare to vote in favor of the
Chandler Bill unless a new wave of cholera brakes out again.4
Chandler blamed the shipping lobby for the successful agitation
against his plans and called restrictionists to organize to form a counter-
balance (Chandler 1893, 3).
IMMIGRATION RESTRICTION LOBBY AND THE
RACIALIZATION OF EUROPEAN MIGRATION
This corroborates Freeman’s assertion (1995, 885) that interest groups
benefitting from immigration were better organized than those who bear
4Head agency New York to directors Rotterdam, Letter October 8, 1891, MAR, HAL,
318.04 Passage, 221.
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the costs. Labor unions may have been the biggest pressure group, and
they took much longer than shipping companies to openly take a stance
and lobby for restrictions on southern and eastern European migration
(Goldin 1994, 224; Clemens 1997, 5). Terence Powderly, leader of the
Knights of Labor, labeled new immigrants as “semi-barbarian” who
accepted degrading living and working conditions because they had no
intention to become Americans, but returned home. Powderly accused
them of lowering American standards (Powderly 1888, 165–74). This
political claim countered the image of the immigrant as the cornerstone
for the wealth of the nation. By the mid-1890s, the biggest union, the
American Federation of Labor (AFL) took over the rhetoric and endorsed
restrictions, yet its membership remained divided on the issue. Part of the
intellectual community provided scientific arguments to motivate these
nativist claims. Already in the 1880s, members of the American Economic
Association suggested a literacy test to reduce immigration from new
regions while keeping the gates open for northern and western Europeans.
A group of Harvard intellectuals institutionalized this elitist movement by
founding the Immigration Restriction League (IRL) in 1894 (Bemis
1888; 251–64; Higham 1955, 112–13; Jones 1992, 188–92; Tichenor
2002, 76–83; Zolberg 2006, 194–211).
The IRL transcended party politics and created the first lasting plat-
form for restrictionists. Its lobby strategies greatly mirrored those of the
shipping lines. For the outside bottom-up campaigns, they screened the
press producing a list of 500 papers willing to propagate their ideals. To
stir the public, IRL members organized speeches and distributed pam-
phlets. For the inside top-down campaigns, they opened an office in
Washington headed by James Patten. He distributed information and law
proposals among congressmen. The lobbyist coordinated the immigration
restriction lobby at the hearings of the House and Senate immigration
committees, where their efforts concentrated. The IRL used scientific
arguments and participated in the academic debate. The movement con-
stantly denounced the shipping lobby for sabotaging restrictions for pecu-
niary gain, while being unconcerned about the country’s future. To get
their hands-on compromising proofs, they hired private detectives. The
IRL founded its political claim on ethno-cultural differences stating that
the United States was committing racial suicide through unrestricted
immigration. They advocated the literacy test which was introduced by
their voice in Congress, Senator Henry Lodge. Labor unions supported
the campaign for this educational test bill, the first organized lobby effort
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against immigration in this era (Higham 1955, 103–07; Tichenor 2002,
16–17, 76; Zeidel 2004, 17; Feys 2013, 252).
That this happened during an economic downturn when migrants
were an easy scapegoat is no surprise. It also explains the near success
of the less experienced anti-immigration lobby. The category of “capital-
ist owners” referred to by Goldin (1994, 253) and Tichenor (2002, 82)
in theory should include shipping interests, but in practice coincides
with American employers and industrialists. They point to a near
absence of pro-immigration interest groups stating that employers
refrained from lobbying against restrictions because of the 1890s eco-
nomic downturn. Neither explain how employers lobbied before requir-
ing further study, yet foreign shipping companies corroborate this drop
of support in their campaign against restrictions and forced them to
resort to expand their lobby efforts. The continental lines depending
more heavily on southern and eastern European migrants (HAL, NGL,
and HAPAG) led the charge as they risked losing 30 percent of their
steerage passengers. The British lines transporting mainly literate British
and Scandinavians felt less concerned as they only risked losing 3 per-
cent of their business. They declined a joint-lobby effort, yet opposed
the literacy test through their own channels. To counter the IRL, the
Continental lines hired two Washington journalists who worked as cor-
respondents for various prominent American newspapers at $80 per
week to agitate in favor of migration. Glavis’ annual salary was raised
to $9,000 to intensify his efforts. The costs were divided between the
lines based on the number of passengers carried. The shipping compa-
nies relied on the foreign-language press and the migrant agents to
mobilize the public, in particular the immigrant communities.5 Efforts
concentrated in western and southern states as a cable from the NGL
to western migrant agents and ethnic associations underlined:
Immigration bill comes up in House on Wednesday; wire your congressmen, our expense,
protesting against proposed exclusion and requesting bill be defeated, informing him that a
vote in favor means defeat in next election.6
5Ibid. Letters July 17, 1895, and January 28 and February 14, 1896; 318.02 Directors,
112–121.
6“Foreign Steamship Agitation against the Immigration Restriction Bill,” IRL circular
February 22, 1897; Harvard Open Collection Program (HOCP): Immigration 1789–
1930.
12 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW
Anti-Trust Movement and Ethnic Mobilization
The restrictionists got their hands-on NGL’s cable and published it
widely. Their education bill passed the House and Senate in 1896.
President Cleveland rejected the “un-American” bill, and although the
House overrode his veto, the Senate buried the act. Restrictionists
attributed its defeat to the German-American community which, how-
ever, would have remained largely unaffected by it. The IRL produced
pamphlets that this support had been obtained by the shipping compa-
nies that portrayed the bill as an Anglo-Saxon scheme to cripple the
German-American element.7 Shipping lines chose to do so because the
targeted immigrant groups from southern and eastern Europe were less
established to voice their protest. Conversely, no ethnic community was
better organized and had more political weight than the German
American. The continental lines supported many German-American
associations through membership or advertising to retain close ties with
their pioneering client base. The British lines used the same strategies
as they spent their “educational fund,” named after the bill, to stir
protests among the influential Irish community rather than new immi-
grant groups (Martin 2003, 134; Feys 2013, 259). The defeat of the
bill spurred by old-stock immigrant communities gave the opportunity
for newer ethnic groups to swell their numbers, organize, and gain
political influence. Russia, the Austrian–Hungarian Empire, and Italy
accounted for 90 percent of these “in-betweens,” as Roediger (2005)
labeled them for not being considered as fully white neither as non-
white (Keeling 2012, 23). It allowed them to initiate a long struggle
to get recognition of equality with their predecessors from northern
and western Europe and to achieve full “white status.” Despite varying
degrees of whiteness among the European migrants, Guglielmo (2003,
28–30) underlined that the newcomers never lost their “white on arri-
val” voting privileges. After a five-year residency, they could obtain citi-
zenship and with it gain political power to climb up the “socio-ethnic”
ladder.
Shipping interests stimulated this process by helping defeating the
educational bill by a small margin. Yet their ability to openly fight
restrictions decreased because of the growing fears of the public toward
the ascendency of big business and the passage of the Sherman Antitrust
7Ibid. IRL to newspapers, letter January 25, 1898.
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Act (1890) which had to protect the public from monopolies. Shipping
conferences initially managed to evade the anti-trust radar, yet after the
turn of the century it came under increased scrutiny (Chandler 1977,
172; Bittlingmayer 1996, 375–78). The IRL’s accusations of being the
driving force behind the pro-immigration lobby and defending predomi-
nately foreign business interests undermined the shipping lobby’s cam-
paigns. They could not deny that pecuniary gains were their main
motive making their direct interventions during the trust-busting climate
increasingly delicate. Their campaigns would gain much more credibility
if expressed by ethnic communities the HAL head-agent in New York
reported:
Hoping that the ameliorating economic conditions will turn the public opinion in favor of
immigration, to influence it and go up against the IRL, the HAPAG and NGL elaborated
a plan to establish a Pro-Immigration Leaugue. Joseph Senner, journalist and former Com-
missioner of Immigration of New York has been appointed to lead the League and set up
branches nationwide. He will travel throughout the country, hold lectures and recruit
members, especially in the West. [. . .] To cover up our involvement, the League will dis-
tance itself completely of the steamship lines and even create the impression to oppose us.
[. . .] The Germans asked to contribute, yet not to mention it to any other lines out of fear
that it may leak out.8
Aiming to recruit as many members as possible, membership only
cost a symbolic dollar. Shipping lines provided the funding paying
Senner’s salary and expenses. The Austrian-born had the perfect profile
to lead the propaganda campaign. He was a former editor of the
New York Staats-Zeitung. Senner also helped introduce the literacy test
in Congress when heading Ellis Island and was known for his stance
against the shipping lines. Contrary to what leading scholars have
assumed, not the associations representing various ethnic and nationality
groups, but shipping companies formed the cornerstone of the Immi-
gration Protective League (IPL). Conversely to what Tichenor states,
the IPL did not mirror the IRL but profited from the long-standing
lobby experience of the shipping interest and functioned as their
mouthpiece (Senner 1894, 499, 1897, 8; Higham 1955, 107; King
2000, 56; Tichenor 2002, 81–83; Zeidel, 2004, 12; Zolberg 2006,
222).
8Head agency New York to directors Rotterdam, letter November 16, 1897. MAR, HAL,
318.04 Passage, 221–26.
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Figure 1: US Immigration Reform for European Migration and the Literacy test during
the Progressive Era
1882 Immigration Act (excluding: people likely to become a public charge, idiots and convicts)
1884 Contract labor law (excluding contract laborers)
1891 Immigration Act (excluding: polygamists, people with contagious & loathsome diseases)
1896 Bill containing literacy test passes Senate and House
1897 Presidential Veto against Literacy test
1898 Literacy test passes Senate but not the House (appointment of Industrial Commission)
1902 House passes a Literacy test, but dropped from bill in Senate
1903 Immigration Act (exclusion of anarchists, prostitutes, the insane and epileptics)
1906 House drops the Literacy test in favor of investigation commission
1907 Immigration Act (appointment of Dillingham Commission)
1913 Presidential Veto against Literacy test
1915 Presidential Veto against Literacy test
1917 Presidential Veto overridden: Immigration Act containing Literacy Test
1921/24 Quota Acts
Senner challenged a new version of the educational bill as a threat to
the future of German schools, language, churches, and newspapers. At the
top of the IPL Oscar Strauss, a progressive Jew and Bourke Cockran, a
prominent Irishman, joined to transcend ethnic and religious boundaries.
IPL reached out to the entire immigrant community through mass meetings
and the press. The bill passed the Senate, yet Glavis reassured that President
McKinley would prevent it from being considered in the House. Catholics
and foreign-born citizens had supported his rise to power, and he did not
want to ignore their protests. Instead, German-born Republican Richard
Bartholdt successfully introduced a bill for a commission to investigate and
recommend legislation to meet the problems created by industrialization and
immigration. Bartholdt, a former journalist and newspaper editor, was one
of the continental lines’ inside men in the House (1893–1915). He helped
pro-immigration forces in their battle with restrictionists to influence the
appointment of the members of the Industrial Commission consisting of 10
congressmen and nine expert civilians. It took three years to complete its
report stalling any far-reaching legislation on immigration (Hutchinson
1981, 124–25; Just 1988, 224; Lissak 1994, 220–21; Zeidel 2004, 20–34).9
CONSOLIDATION OF THE PRO-IMMIGRATION LOBBY
The Industrial Commission relieved the pressures on immigration advocates
resulting in the dissolution of the IPL. Shipping lines no longer considered
9Ibid. Letters March 11, and May 13, 1898. IRL to newspapers, circular January 25,
1898. HOCP, Immigration 1789–1930.
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the situation to warrant the expenditure and suspended their financial sup-
port. The commission did not recommend a literacy test. The shipping
lobby influenced these suggestions in the House through William Shattuc,
chairman of the committee of immigration. Nevertheless, restrictionists
managed to add a literacy test amendment. To oppose it in Congress, the
HAL, HAPAG, and NGL relied on Claude Bennet who substituted the
deceased Glavis. Through his Congressional Information Bureau, Bennet
provided detailed reports on congressional debates and off-the-record opin-
ions on maritime and immigration issues. To defend their interests at the
congressional immigration committees, they now relied on A. Anderson of
the American Line. Under the impulse of JP Morgan, one of the biggest
shipping mergers on record was established in 1902, the International Mer-
cantile Marine Company (IMMCO). The American initiative to regain
maritime control over the North Atlantic came about partly because of the
conviction that Congress would adopt policies giving it competitive advan-
tages over foreign lines. When this failed, the combine turned into a multi-
national initiative formed around British and American lines but also
included a profit sharing agreement with the HAPAG and NGL which was
part of the deal bought in a controlling interest of the HAL. This had a
merging effect on the lobby efforts of the North Atlantic passenger lines.
Anderson now represented most of the shipping companies in Congress. He
received assistance of lawyer lobbyists working for the shipping lines such as
Lucius Beers and Sam Neale. The companies coordinated their lobbying
activities through a special “immigration law committee.” Other special
committees such as “Immigrant inspection,” “Southern states,” or “Ellis
Island” underline how shipping companies closed their ranks and targeted to
influence not only the enactment, but also the implementation of the laws.10
The “immigration law committee” coordinated the protest of other
interest groups in Washington including immigrant communities, rail-
roads, employers, and manufacturers which now supported the efforts
until World War I. The economic upswing explains their renewed
involvement in the debates after 1898. Also the sources of foreign ship-
ping lines may underrate the connections between American capitalist and
shipping interests. Sources of American shipping interests would probably
show stronger ties. Once the conflict of lobbying interests between foreign
and American shipping interests were appeased after the IMMCO merger
10Head agency New York to directors Rotterdam, Correspondence and reports October
18, 1902, to October 25, 1905. MAR, HAL, 318.04 Passage, 72–77.
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and the entry of Morgan in the shipping business, ties with American
capitalist and employers consolidated. This is illustrated by the creation of
the National Civic Foundation (NCF). Led by Senator Mark Hannah,
known for his close ties with American shipping interests and Morgan,
the NCF tried to reconcile business interests with the public and labor
unions. Promoting liberal migration policies was high on the agenda.
With the “southern states committee,” the shipping lines spurred
pro-immigration sentiments in the South where state-sponsored immigra-
tion bureaus revived. The Senate dropped the literacy test amendment
when enacting the immigration law of 1903. Anderson still complained to
Shattuc, who countered by stating that the law had been stripped of the
most detrimental features for the shipping lines while ensuring no further
action in the near future. In his own words recorded in congressional
records: “He [Anderson] wrote most of the bill. He ought to be satisfied
with it” (Ward 1907, 590). Immigration remained a hot topic in the
press with the New York World and New York Herald branded as agitators
for restrictions. Other papers denounced the hypocrisy of both newspapers
whose founders were both immigrants.11 By 1906, a new general immi-
gration bill including a literacy test was passed by the Senate.
Armed with a fund based on a 10-cent contribution per third-class
passenger carried to the United States in 1905, the shipping lobby
retained its success formula. It relied on influential congressmen holding
key positions; maximized their close ties with the press to “educate the
public”; targeted southern and western states; and mobilized the corporate
interests and immigrant communities. Old-stock immigrant groups con-
tinued to send delegations to Washington to protest against the test. The
German-American Alliance and Catholic Ancient Order of Hibernians
were now joined by new immigrant associations such as the Philadelphia
Italian Society, the Hungarian Republican Club, and the Federation of
Jewish Organizations. In the meantime, a new cross-ethnic, nonsectarian,
and nonpartisan organization was founded to substitute the IPL. The
National Liberal Immigration League (NLIL) started off as a Jewish initia-
tive but soon included Irish-, German-, and Italian-born representatives.
Various religious leaders joined, as did some prominent academics such as
Charles Elliot and Woodrow Wilson, presidents of Harvard University
and Princeton University, respectively. Politicians, Democrats and
Republicans alike, also became members such congressmen Joseph Can-
11Ibid., letters May 9 and June 9, 1905.
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non and William Bennet. Louis Hammerling of the American Association
of Foreign Language Newspapers (AAFLN) also filled the ranks. The
NLIL played a crucial role in outside lobbying. The headquarters in New
York soon branched out nationwide. Through mass meetings and press
campaigns, it created awareness on the immigration restriction issue
among ethnic groups and mobilized its participation. It united organiza-
tions nationwide to adopt resolutions against restrictions and send letters
to congressmen. The NLIL also appointed a lobbyist in Washington,
James Curley, for inside lobbying purposes. These were orchestrated by
the league’s financers, the shipping lines, and big businessmen such as
Andrew Carnegie. The efforts paid off as the literacy test was substituted
by a congressional investigation on immigration in the new immigration
law (1907) (Lissak 1994, 208–23; Zeidel 2004, 27–32).12
The Dillingham Commission stalled immigration reform for four
years. The pro-immigration man on the commission, William Bennet,
successfully defeated Lodge to extend the research as far as possible to
delay legislative action. However, he could not prevent the commission to
recommend the literacy test as the “most feasible single method of restrict-
ing undesirable migration.” The IRL’s propagation of social Darwinism
was clearly present in the commission’s conclusions. Already before the
turn of the century, the IRL contributed to the introduction of a list of
races and people that classified newcomers at the gates not only by coun-
try of origin, but also by racial and ethnic background. This enhanced the
differentiation of Europeans into various degrees of whiteness which was
based on Ripley’s book Races of Europe, attributing superior racial features
to old-stock immigrants. It facilitated the task of immigrant inspectors to
apply the existing immigration laws more strictly on southern and eastern
Europeans. The commission hired the anthropologist Franz Boas to inves-
tigate Ripley’s assumptions and refuted the racial inferiority of new immi-
grants attaching more importance to cultural than biological determinants
for differences. The IRL discredited Boas for being a lapdog of the ship-
ping interest, pointing to his family ties with the HAPAG New York
head-agent Emil Boas. This may have influenced the Dillingham Com-
12Ibid., Correspondence from January 1905 to December 1907. 318.02 Directors, 112–
121, 318.04 Passage, 72–77; Hammerling to Department of Commerce and Labour,
September 8, 1909. National Archives Washington (NAW), Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (RINS) 1787–1998, RG 85, 52600/13, Investigation at Ellis Island 1909;
Correspondence 1907 to 1916, NAW, RINS, RG 85, 51632/13, National Liberal Immi-
gration League.
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mission who ignored Boas’ conclusions (King 2000, 61–70; Weil 2003,
271–96; Zeidel 2004, 101–14).
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND
THE PRESS
The IRL distributed thousands of copies of the report’s summary, feeling
confident to make an end to the “foreign communities, foreign shipping
lines and foreign-language newspaper’s efforts” which made sure that
“there are much more stringent regulations to import cattle, sheep, hogs,
dogs and horses than human beings” (Ward 1910, 56–57; Hall 1912,
94–102). Depicting business interests as interfering with national welfare
was a popular strategy to gain support for one’s cause during the Progres-
sive Era. The IRL may have tended to exaggerate the role of shipping
companies who it designated as their main opponent, yet it is undeniable
that the accusations had strong factual roots. IRL’s instigations con-
tributed to the appointment of a congressional committee investigating
illicit lobby practices, but the investigation did not uncover strong incrim-
inating evidence against the shipping lobby.13 In the meantime, new eth-
nic organizations gained maturity as illustrated by the American Jewish
Committee’s sponsored economic research which refuted the Dillingham
Commission’s conclusions (Hourwich 1912).
Also the foreign-language press became better organized after attain-
ing the height of its boom with 3,500 new papers appearing between
1883 and 1920. The papers did not escape the general trend of becoming
increasingly commercialized and moving ideologically toward the center.
Spurred by the control over advertising revenues, press monopolies estab-
lished themselves in most American cities. In particular, the foreign-lan-
guage press fell under commercial control. The advertising agency
AAFLN was founded by corporate interests and the Republican Party to
endorse William Taft’s 1909 presidential campaign under the immigrant
community. Headed by Hammering, the association claimed to reach
32 million during its apogee. The AAFLN provided political and com-
mercial ads, but also editorials and news materials which shaped the polit-
ical, social, and economic orientation of 205 papers in 1908, 508 by
1912, and 813 in 1916. Shipping lines also entrusted the advertising and
13Ibid. correspondence 1910 to 1912.
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lobby campaigns to the AAFLN (Ewen 1976, 62–65; Tichenor 2002,
131; Petit 2010, 66–67).14
President Taft’s campaign for reelection coincided with congressional
consideration of new bills based on the Dillingham Commission’s sugges-
tions. To capture the foreign-born vote, Taft declared he would veto any
bill containing a literacy test. He relied on former Congressman William
Bennet and on the AAFLN to consolidate his ties to foreign-born commu-
nities. The shipping lines also hired Bennet to lobby in Washington. There
the minority base against restrictions grew thinner. In 1907, court decisions
ruled the recruiting campaigns of southern states to be in violation of the
immigration law. After the ruling, the racial tensions against migrants from
southern and eastern Europe in the South radicalized. This pushed the
majority of the southern congressmen to switch sides and endorse the liter-
acy test. Instead of relying on the geographic internal division of the coun-
try, Bennet now instigated religious differences. He relied on the Catholic
members of Congress. At the hearings in Congress and the White House,
ethnic groups were joined by Catholic representatives such as cardinals
James Gibbons and John Farley. The NLIL presented the president a peti-
tion against the bill signed by 400,000 people nationwide. Despite losing
the elections, President Taft kept his word and vetoed the bill. The Senate
overrode his veto, but the House failed to do so by a small margin
(Hutchinson 1981, 154; Lissak 1994; Tichenor 2002, 135–37; Zeidel
2004, 124).15
In the meantime, the American anti-trust fever hit the shipping
world. Congress appointed a commission lead by Joshua Alexander to
analyze the monopolistic tendencies in the shipping industry. Freight and
passenger lines agreed on more transparency and started a large-scale
$72,000 propaganda campaign to explain their business operations to the
American public.16 It presented facts on the benefits of shipping confer-
ence agreements for the US economy and convinced the public of their
honorable intentions through the idea that “the only effective channel to
reach the people and move the public opinion – the news columns of the
14Ibid. Letter March 16, 1915, 318.02 Directors, 233.
15Ibid. Letter February 13, 1913, 318.02 Directors, 120. Letters December 17 and 18,
1912, January 17 and 21, February 4, 13, 15, 18, and 20, 1913, 318.03 Passage, 48–58,
97, 160, 190. The New York Times (NYT). “Taft sits as judge on the immigration bill”
and “Immigration Bill in Doubt” February 7 and 14, 1913.
16Ibid. Letters December 18, 1911, January 18, March 4 and 5, April 6 and 12, June 18,
1912, 318.02 Directors, 112–121.
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American press.” They chose factual rather than argumentative magazine
and newspaper articles prepared by writers of reputation to increase the
chances of being picked up by newspaper editors:
The American people would resent any attempt of the steamship or any other sort of inter-
est, to control the course of legislation secretly or by improper methods. Much of the feel-
ings against great corporations in the US, is due to the belief that in the past these
corporations have been able to influence legislation in their own interest by secret relations
with legislators, by heavy contributions to campaign funds, and by attempts in one way or
another to subsidise the press. To the open presentation of facts through legitimate chan-
nels, on the other hand, there is no popular objection. In fact it is coming to be recognised
as the only effective means of placing any question of public interest and importance
before the people.17
The shipping lines’ representatives taking charge of the campaign
underlined that congressmen responded to public sentiment. Passing legis-
lation through Congress that opposed it, even if facts proved the public
sentiment to be wrong, was very difficult. They argued that educating the
public had become a responsibility of the corporations. No immediate
reversal of the public opinion was to be expected, but the efforts would
pay off in the long run. The lines also openly collaborated with Alexan-
der’s committee. This resulted in a joint publication of steamship men
and academic specialists of Alexander’s committee in the Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 55(1) in 1914. It
explained and defended the need for shipping conferences for the broader
public. It expressed the committees’ conclusions which only opposed some
minor features of the conference system. This underlined the growing
importance of public opinion and acting according to “public interests,”
but also highlights the significance of scientific opinions to assess policies
which characterized the Progressive Era.18
THE DOWNFALL OF THE PRO-IMMIGRATION LOBBY
The open communication related to business practices such as pooling,
price-fixing, rebates, or fighting steamers, but not to their lobby campaigns
against immigration restrictions. The Alexander investigation increased
17Report of special committee of steamship lines engaged in foreign trade, June 22, 1913,
318.02 Directors, 120.
18Ibid. Reports April 15 and June 22, 1913, and letter head agency to directors April 6,
1914.
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lobby efforts as all conference passenger lines closed their ranks even more.
Yet President Wilson’s declaration to veto any bill containing such a test
did not discourage the IRL. With the outbreak of World War I and fast-
dropping overseas immigration rates, the issue no longer seemed pressing.
To prevent their cause from losing momentum, the IRL hired a publicity
agency, the Far Eastern Bureau, and a publicity agent, Mr. Fairbaten. They
spread the belief through the press that an unprecedented immigration
wave from Europe and Asia would follow when peace returned. To give
their arguments academic credibility, the IRL paid Professor Jeremiah
Jenks to publish propaganda articles. Living in the general assumption that
the war would not last long, the IRL underlined the urgency of adequate
legislation. Bennet refuted the predicted migration tsunami through histor-
ical evidence showing that migration did not increase after previous wars.19
Yet WWI totally disrupted the pro-immigration lobby. Some shipping
companies belonging to the Central Powers such as HAPAG and NGL
immediately suspended their service because of the maritime blockade.
Many vessels from Entente Powers were requisitioned, diminishing their ser-
vice. Sea mines and submarine warfare put further strains on the North
Atlantic traffic. Neutral lines such as the HAL were still able to retain their
regular service until 1917. Immediately, most shipping companies struggled
with an acute cash flow problem. The German lines cut wages of personnel
in half and stopped all advertising. Other lines still in service strongly
reduced their advertising campaigns. If the American press was ever “muz-
zled by steamship advertising” as claimed by the IRL, the war weakened the
financial ties between the press and shipping interests (Hall 1913, 748).
More importantly, the conflict undermined the shipping cartel agreements,
and by 1915, the British lines withdrew from the Mediterranean and Conti-
nental conference, quickly succeeded by all other companies. Only the Bri-
tish–Scandinavian conference remained operative. The war totally disrupted
the organization of the joint shipping lobby efforts and crippled its financial
strength being at its weakest when a new educational bill passed Congress.20
19Ibid. Letter March 10, 1914. Minutes of IRL meetings September 24, October 23,
November 27, December 11, 1914; Circulars IRL by Prescott Hall January 5, 6, 14, and
19, 1915. HOCP, Immigration 1789–1930. The New York World, s.t., September 14,
1914, and The New York Sun, “Effect of European war on Migration” October 25, 1914.
NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-E, Immigration WWI.
20Head agency New York to directors, Letter August 18, 1914, MAR, HAL, 318.02, 121,
and Letters December 25, 1914; January 26, February 19 and 27, March 12, 1915,
318.03 Passage, 232–235.
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One of their mouth pieces, the NLIL was also in decline. It suf-
fered from the personal financial collapse of its president, Edward Lauter-
bach. It symbolizes the decline of migrant communities as an interest
group. The war stirred nationalism among the immigrant groups, weak-
ening the cross-ethnic cohesion the NLIL advocated. The German-Amer-
ican community lost its influence, especially after the sinking of the
RMS Lusitania. American nationalism stirred anti-immigrant feelings.
The movement’s influence was dealt another blow when the AFL pub-
lished documents on contributions paid to NLIL by industrialists, rail-
roads, and shipping corporations denouncing it for defending big
business interests (Lissak 1994; 231–35). At the hearings in the White
House on a bill containing a literacy test, the pro-immigration lobby was
notably less organized than before the war. Nonetheless, the former
NLIL member, President Wilson, vetoed the bill for going against Amer-
ica’s tradition as land of opportunities: “it excludes those to whom the
opportunities of elementary education have been denied [. . .] it is not a
test of quality of character or of personnel fitness, but a tests of opportu-
nity. Those who come seeking opportunity are not to be admitted unless
they already had one of the chief opportunities they seek, the opportunity
of education. The object of such provision is restriction, not selection.”21
With only five votes in the House preventing the veto to be over-
ridden, the IRL and AFL tasted blood. Now rooted in an “America for
Americans” rhetoric, they enhanced their campaign.22 All this while
NLIL was scratching for funds asking the HAL to increase its annual
contribution slightly to $2,500. Already in 1913, the HAL had raised
its contribution, praising the league for its excellent work in mobilizing
public opinion and spreading information on the benefits of immigra-
tion. The HAL still considered the NLIL as a crucial partner to fight
restrictions and together with the Cunard Line and NGL continued
their support despite the NLIL declining activity and influence. This
refutes Lissak’s (1994, 237) suggestion that the financial support from
businessmen was individual, sporadic, and, after 1913, insignificant.
From the start, shipping lines supported NLIL financially and logistically
until the end. Midway in 1916, the shipping lines also mobilized the
railroads who committed to fight the educational bill. Under the lead of
21Ibid. Letters January 31, February 1 and 4, 1914, 318.03 Passage, 232.
22http://www.history.umd.edu/Gompers/quotes.htm#IMMIGRATION, accessed on March
12 2013.
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HAL and Cunard Line, the companies sent out representatives through-
out the country to stir the public. The local migrant agents arranged
meetings with politicians, members of merchant and manufacturers asso-
ciations, etc. Surprisingly, no meetings with ethnic associations were
mentioned, which suggest their fading influence. The lines therefore
focused their efforts on mobilizing industrialist interests. The general
impression was a lack of awareness of the disadvantages of the bill
among the associations. Most also seemed unaware of how their repre-
sentatives had voted on the last educational bill. There was a general
lack of interest for the issue among industrialists. The HAL also denoted
a lack of organization among the steamship lines and lamented the
absence of a lobbyist in Washington. Without urgent action, the much
better organized labor union would pass the bill.23
That shipping companies managed to retain such level of lobbying
activity despite the disruptive impact of the war on their business is
remarkable. Yet their weakened position combined with the downfall of
immigrant group protests and the lack of support from employers and
industrialists turned the tide in favor of labor unions and the IRL. In
1917, Congress overrode Wilson’s second veto. 23 years after being first
introduced and having passed one of the Houses of Congress 17 times,
the literacy test was finally enacted. By then, literacy had strongly
increased in southern and eastern Europe, turning the bill into a more
symbolic victory. Therefore, the IRL immediately used the momentum to
work on a restrictive bill based on national origins.24 By the time the
shipping interests regained some normality reestablishing cartel agree-
ments, Congress approved the Quota Acts, greatly restricting the volume
of immigration on nationality and ethnic backgrounds discriminating
against eastern and southern Europeans. Shipping companies believed
these to be temporary relying on improved economic conditions to
increase the demand for labor and turn the tide. Instead with the crash of
1929, the transatlantic migrant market completely collapsed, forcing many
passenger shipping companies to bankruptcy and with it ending its pivotal
role in shaping early US immigration reform.
23MAR, HAL, Letters November 11, 1913, December 25, 1915; January 12, June 9, 17,
and 21, and July 5, 1916. 318.03 Passage, 160, 232–35, 257.
24Minutes of IRL meeting, March 23, 1917. HOCP, Immigration 1789–1930.
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CONCLUSION
If we project Freeman’s interest group-driven model through a historical
lens, this article proposes that the most constant, long-established and
hence driving force behind the pro-immigration lobby during the long
nineteenth century was not employers or migrant communities but ship-
ping companies. Their lobby efforts can be traced back to the sailship era,
but such efforts were professionalized as restrictive pressures grew adapting
to institutional changes during the Progressive Era. Their influence on
migration policies not only dates back longer, they were also more consis-
tent than employer interests that were more reluctant to defend the cause
during economic downturns. Shipping companies never backed down, not
even under growing anti-trust pressures. They stimulated the mobilization
of the migrant communities to strengthen both their inside top-down and
outside bottom-up lobby campaigns. Their efforts first centered on the
old-stock communities with greater political power to later shift to newer
immigrant communities. Protest of older communities gave new immi-
grant groups who were the targets of restrictions time to grow and orga-
nize. The shipping lobby also constantly sought the support of employers
and capitalists with whom they coordinated the efforts.
The shipping interest’s perspective corroborates the premise that
those who benefit from immigration had greater incentives to organize
than those who carried the cost. No interest group benefitted more
directly from migration. The shipping lobby’s top-down efforts first
stalled US immigration reforms through diplomats using the rhetoric that
migration was a matter of international trade. Yet by the 1880s, the con-
viction that immigration was a matter of national sovereignty became gen-
erally accepted. Supranational influences on migration policies decreased,
leaving the debate to the national domestic arena as in Freeman’s model.
Diplomats disappeared from the lobbying scene and were replaced by pro-
fessional lobbyists. These intermediaries circulated vital information
between the shipping lobby and policy makers, allowing the former to
react quickly to provide the latter with the necessary incentives, strategies,
arguments, and bills to oppose restrictions. They stalled and attenuated
new reforms using institutional changes and the growing need for expert
advice by pushing for congressional investigation committees of unprece-
dented scale to their advantage. The shipping lobby was initially frag-
mented and restricted to inside top-down activities. Shipping cartels and
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mergers collectivized the shipping lobby efforts which during the 1890s
expanded to bottom-up strategies and the mobilization of other interest
groups. For the bottom-up strategies, the shipping lobby mainly counted
on journalists and migrant communities. It financed and sometimes even
established national and cross-ethnic associations, providing crucial citizen
support which voiced their protest on the streets, in the press, and in
Washington. To stir the public in favor of immigration, the shipping
lobby hired journalists to screen the press, spread propaganda in news-
papers, magazines, and scientific journals. Their advertising campaigns
and the migrant-agent network procured the shipping lines close ties with
mass media.
The assumption that the public followed the “Iron law” of being in
favor of restrictions is questionable. Research on public opinion is nearly
nonexistent for this period. Polls are not available, yet a political claims-
making analysis based on newspaper sources should reveal new insights.
This study highlights that interest groups attached a growing importance
to influence the public sentiment as an integral part of their lobby cam-
paigns. The shipping lobby spread propaganda to influence the public in
general, yet the core of its campaigns was directed to segments based on
geographic, sectarian, and ethnic determinants. They fed the political
claim that restrictions were a scheme from eastern interests to hamper the
development of the South and the West. When this assertion lost support,
they shifted their focus on sectarian differences portraying the restrictions
as a means to oppress the Catholic and Jewish elements. Linked to those
are the ethnic differences which were instigated by representing the liter-
acy test as an Anglo-Saxon scheme to repress other ethnic groups. By
playing on the ethnic sentiments of immigrant communities, the shipping
lobby managed to mobilize a visible citizen support on the streets and in
Washington, whose electoral vote gained importance in political cam-
paigns. This support is something that restrictionists lacked. Although the
labor unions represented their members in Washington, these never took
the streets to demand restrictions. The IRL ran propaganda campaigns to
stir the public sentiment, yet the elitist movement was unable to mobilize
citizen support. That the public endorsed their claims is an assumption
that has no empirical grounds. This paper conversely suggests that civil
society was a much stronger source of liberalism than restrictionism, cor-
roborating Geddes and Statham’s findings (2006, 255) that pro-migrant
lobby strongly colonizes the “organized public.”
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However, these researchers also strongly play down the importance
of interest groups and public opinion on policy outcomes which they see
as being determined in a relatively autonomous way by political elites that
favor restrictions. The voting patterns on the literacy test in Congress con-
firm the restrictive stance of a majority of the legislators. So why then did
it take 23 years to pass the test? Part of the answer lays in the institutional
system that requires a majority to pass reforms, whereas a minority is
enough to prevent or stall legislation. This article claims however that the
intervention of the shipping lobby was crucial to maintain a minority big
enough to oppose restrictions. If legislators felt relative autonomy in their
decisions, the pro-immigration lobby made sure to remind them directly
and indirectly, by mobilizing part of their constituents, that this could
come at an electoral cost. By organizing the immigrant groups, the ship-
ping lobby made this threat tangible. Not until the Great War totally dis-
rupted the shipping lobby and the opposition of migrant communities,
did restrictions finally pass. As Suro (2009, 220) observed on today’s
immigration reforms, political mobilization is short and intense and aimed
at blocking rather than advocating legislation. While the American public
is beset in ambivalence regarding migration, the most vocal segments of
the population are those espousing minority views. Going by historical
evidence, the current stalemate on immigration may still drag on for a
while, but there is a need for more research looking at actors that operate
beneath the surface. Transport companies may no longer earn most of
their revenues from migrant traffic, yet migration policies still have a
major impact on the mobility of their passengers, now mainly consisting
of tourists. The fact that most irregular migrants come in as tourists has
subjected this class of passengers to much more scrutiny. Also, to this day,
authorities use transport companies as an integrated part of the border
enforcement system. Therefore, the transport sector still has very good
reasons to influence current debates, laws and their enforcement but their
role remains absent in scientific research.
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